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"Our task is not to cast around in the European Human Rights 
Reports like blackletter lawyers seeking clues... it is to draw 
out the broad principles which animate the convention"^ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Neither the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the 
"ECHR") nor its Additional Protocols contain a provision such as, at a univer-
sal level, Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (hereinafter 
"UDHR") 1948 or Article 33 of the International Convention on the Status of 
Refugees of 1951 (hereinafter "Geneva Convention") or, at a regional levels, 
Article 27 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man or Arti-
cle 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union2. This does 
not signify, however, that the ECHR and its Protocols do not recognize asylum 
as a subjective right. On the contrary, the European Court of Human Rights has 
1. Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley, 
Warwickshire v Wallbank and another [2003] UKHL 37, para. 44 at 404j. 
2. See GIL BAZO, M.T., "The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
the Right to Be Granted Asylum in the Union's Law" (2008) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 33 ff. 
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given a number of decisions relating to violations of human rights that can have 
a direct impact on asylum seekers, refugees and internationally displaced per-
sons. For example, when it emphasized the obligation of Contracting States to 
take measures which guarantee the full and free employ of the rights recognised 
in the ECHR to every individual under its jurisdiction3. Again, when it stressed 
that the principle of equal entitlement is strengthened by Article 14, that forbids 
discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights and freedoms indicated 
below4. Thus it is clear that, in theory, there is little to prevent the application of 
ECHR rights and freedoms to asylum seekers. Furthermore, unsurprisingly but 
crucially, in practice, either the Commission and Court of Human Rights have 
desisted from setting up explicit or general boundaries on the application of 
the ECHR in asylum cases. On the contrary, they have adopted some dynamic 
interpretative principles, that have positive repercussions to the protection that 
the Convention grants to asylum seekers. These are outlined below, alone with 
a number of the institutions' other more general advances, that are inner to the 
way in which asylum cases are decided. Nevertheless, the ECHR itself does not 
provide for asylum seekers based rights. 
Why the application of the ECHR in asylum cases is important? To answer 
this you have to consider, firstly, that international asylum law is disappoint-
ingly missing out to protect the vulnerable, that is to say illegitimate asylum 
seekers and children seeking asylum though these subjects are truly the most at 
risk, as well as that it is practically unfeasible for those of them escaping mal-
treatments to find legal and safe means of travel5. Secondly, at a more general 
level, you can not disregard that asylum as well as refugee law have to be con-
sidered an essential part of the contemporary debate on human rights6. Thirdly, 
a number of fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR such as access to social 
security, health care and work may be of crucial relevance to all asylum seek-
ers. Last but not least, you have to appreciate that the rights to seek and "enjoy" 
asylum are at the heart of individual autonomy as they enable an individual to 
enter a State to seek sanctuary. Consequently, the adoption of measures such 
3. This obligation implies the duty of State Parties to organize the governmental apparatus 
and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capa-
ble of juridically ensuring the full and free enjoyment of human rights. 
4. See ex multis Eur Court HR Chassagnou and Others ^.France, Application Nos. 
25088/94, 28331/95, 28443/95, judgment of 29 t h April 1999, Reports 1999, § 89. 
5. See MACADAM, J. and PURCELL, K., "Refugee Protection in the Howard Years: Obstruct-
ing the Right to Seek Asylum" (2008) 27 Australian Yearbook of International Law 87 ff. 
6. See UCARER, E.M., Safeguarding Asylum as a Human Right: NGOs and the European 
Union in JOACHIM, J., LOCHER, B . (eds), Transnational Activism in the UN and the EU: a Com-
parative Study (London: Routledge, 2009) 121 ff. 
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as rejection at the border or if he has already entered the country in which he 
seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any State where he may be 
subjected to persecution, all of which have been supported by national authori-
ties of Contracting States in definite circumstances, go to the essence of asylum 
seekers'choices as to how to live7. This article aims to consider the burden of 
deterring measures to asylum seekers within a human rights framework8. Spe-
cifically, it is the imposition of such measures under the European Convention 
on Human Rights that will be analysed. As Nuala Mole recognised, the number 
of Convention rights which are significant in the asylum field is more than you 
might presume9. The Articles with possible relevance to the rights to seek and 
enjoy asylum will be considered in turn, with the exceptions of Articles 3 of the 
ECHR and 3 of the Fourth Protocol10 as these deserve a separate consideration, 
following either a short background to the ECHR and an initial analysis of the 
implication of the general right to be free from persecution under the Conven-
tion and its applicability to this issue11. 
2. THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM PERSECUTION 
The European Convention on Human Rights which has come to be consid-
ered as "the jewel in the Council of Europe crown"12 -drafted in 1950 in a con-
tinent still reviving from the last world conflict and against a milieu of consid-
erations over the threat of communism- was a unique development and indeed 
a true revolution in international law. Even more importantly here, it was the 
end result of the period and place of its beginning. As such it was not solely pur-
7. See D'ORSI, C , "Asylum and Voluntary Repatriation Applied to the Sub-Saharan Af-
rican Legal Context: Are they Two Viable Solutions for Refugees?" (2008) 86 Revue de Droit 
International de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques 251 ff. 
8. The term "asylum seeker" is adopted here to refer to individuals who have not yet been 
granted refugee status by the receiving State. 
9. See MOLE, N., Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2007) 3 ff. Accordingly, EINARSEN, T., "The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the Notion of an Implied Right to de facto Asylum" (1990) 2 URL 
361. 
10. Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol prohibits a State from expelling its own nationals. 
11. Extended on the meaning of the expression "right to seek and enjoy asylum" one might 
refer to a UN report (MUBANGA CHTPOYA, C.L.L., Final Report. The Right of Everyone to Leave 
ant Country, including His Own, and to Return to His Country, UN doc E/C.4/Sub. 2/1988/35/ 
June 1988, at 103-106.) § 7) stating that: "asylum consists of several elements: to admit aperson 
to the territory of a State, to allow the person to remain there, to refuse to expel, to refuse to 
extradite and not to prosecute, punish or otherwise restrict the person's liberty". 
12. See, HARRIS, D.J.,"AFresh Impetus forthe European Social Charter" (1992)41 ICLQ659 ss. 
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sued at defending fundamental civil and political freedoms and values such as 
the right to live free from persecution. Its paramount objective was to preserve 
a definite system of administration in Europe, that is to say democracy. Indeed 
the ECHR is intended as expressing certain minimum standards to be applied 
in a democratic society. The inflection on the conservation of democracy during 
the drafting of the Convention does not impair, however, the relevance of the 
specific freedoms and rights guaranteed in the ECHR. The freedom to speak, 
to be free from torture and inhuman and degrading treatments, to live, to edu-
cation, and so on, can be regarded as indicative of a general right to be free 
from persecution (or the fear of persecution), a freedom that possibly forms the 
source of the right not to be "refould" in a quantity of international instruments 
such as the Convention against torture and other cruel or degrading treatment 
or punishment (hereinafter "CAT") and the ECHR13. Furthermore, democracy 
as a form of government encompasses, to some extent, this fundamental right to 
every individual, regardless of his or her race, culture, religion or background14. 
Democracy requests the protection of human rights which make possible indi-
vidual freedoms and the defence of the set of laws, in addition to the fundamen-
tal requisites of an elected government. Democracy and the right to live free 
from persecution are, thus, concepts which are reciprocally dependable, as it is 
also positively recalled by the preamble to the ECHR. Finally, on this issue it 
should be pointed out that, even if democracy did not rely upon this freedom, 
the value placed on democracy by European governments at the time of the 
drafting and reception of the ECHR would not sanction the strong protection 
for the right to be free from persecution which has arisen under the Convention 
in practice. The inducement for drafting, and reasons for endorsing, an inter-
national treaty can be quite distinct from the consequences of the additional 
protection supplied by that convention subsequently. 
Like inter alia the right to "enter" per se -that has been ferociously resist-
ed by States which tend to recognize it as an unwelcome intrusion to state sov-
ereignty15- the defence of the right to be free from persecution which is inner to 
the rights protected under the ECHR, is unconditional. Therefore, the freedom 
from persecution or fear of persecution should not be evaluated against the in-
terests of society. This is unquestionable at least in situations where persecution 
13. Amplius FELLER, E., VOLKER, T. y NICHOLSON, F., Refugee protection in international 
law (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) 385 ff. 
14. See GURU, Democracy in Search of Dignity, in UJJWAL KUMAR, S. (ed.), Human Rights 
and Peace: Ideas, Laws, Institutions and Movements (New Delhi, SAGE, 2009) 74 ff. 
15. See NOLL, G , "Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International 
Law"(2005) 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 542 ff. 
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or fear of persecution based on the race, nationality, religion, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion are a synonyms of torture or degrad-
ing treatment or penalty falling within the scope of Article 3 of the ECHR16. 
3. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ECHR TO ASYLUM CASES 
3.1. The Right to Life in Asylum Cases 
Article 2 ECHR protects the most fundamental of all the rights guaranteed 
by the Convention, the right to life. It states that: "...Everyone's right to life 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally...". 
It has been described as truly remarkable that Article 2 guarantees that 
the right to life "shall be protected by law", but, unlike other Convention pro-
visions, it does not recognise the existence of the right to life itself17. Insofar 
as it entails an obligation to protect everyone's right to life, this Article has 
the potentiality to be broadly interpreted. Its meaning is perfectly clarified by 
Professor Fawcett's statement, that is the right to life which must be protected 
by law, and not life itself18. Article 2 does not guarantee protection against all 
threats to life, thus, but safeguards against "intentional deprivation and careless 
endangering of life". Indeed, under Article 2 there are specific situations where 
an authority will not be regarded to have breached a person's right to life. These 
are set out in Article 2 (2) which states that: "Deprivation of life shall not be 
regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use 
of force which is no more that absolutely necessary: a) in defence of any person 
from unlawful violence; b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
escape of a person lawfully detained; c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose 
of quelling a riot or insurrection". In practice, the limitations in Article 2 (2) are 
unlikely to apply in asylum claims as well as in medical and suicide claims, in 
which death would not be caused by lawful or unlawful killing. 
16. The various levels of mistreatment prohibited by this Article exist in a hierarchical 
relationship, as it has been stated by the Commission in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the 
Netherlands v. Greece ("The Greek Case") (1969) 12 Y. B. 1 at 186, where it held that: "all 
torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also degrading". For 
a fuller discussion of these and other issues related to the application of Article 3 of the ECHR 
in the asylum area see infra Ch.. 
17. VAN DIJK, P. & VAN HOOF, G.J.H., Theory And Practice Of The European Convention 
on Human Rights (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998) 586 ff. 
18. See FAWCETT, J.J., The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2°d 
ed (Oxford: OUR 1995) 37. 
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Having been asserted that, you have to consider that this protection of the 
right to life raises some debatable and difficult questions in respect of asylum 
cases: respectively the meaning of the "use of force which is absolutely neces-
sary" and the "death in custody", either of particular relevance to this Article. 
Starting with the "use of force which is absolutely necessary" Article 2 provides 
that deprivation of life will not amount to a violation if it occurs by "use of 
force which is absolutely necessary". Clearly enough this term encompasses a 
commonality of interventions, and can be fully appreciated only if one looks at 
the specific situations. These are: for purpose of defending someone from un-
lawful violence, in order to prevent someone lawfully detained from escaping, 
or to effect a lawful arrest, in a action lawfully taken to quell a riot or insur-
rection. As the European Court plainly stated in Mc Cann19 and more recently 
in Ergi v. Turkey:20 "The use of the term "absolutely necessary" suggests that 
a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed from that 
normally applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary in 
a democratic society" under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR21. In 
particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of 
the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2". This logically 
implies the proportionality has to be assessed having regard to the nature of the 
aim pursued, the dangers to life and limb intrinsic in the situation and the risk 
that the force employed might result in the loss of life22. 
Death in custody presents less significant problems under Article 2. As 
the European Court held in Velikova v. Bulgaria: "where an individual is taken 
into policy custody in good health but is later found dead, it is incumbent upon 
the State to provide a plausible explanation of the events leading to his death, 
failing which the authorities must be hold responsible under Article 2 of the 
ECHR".23 It went on to explain that: "beyond reasonable doubt" standard may 
be met where "events in the issue lie wholly, or in large part, within their control 
or custody"24. In such a case, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect 
of injuries and death occurring that detention. Definitely: "the burden of proof 
may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and con-
19. Eur Court HR Mc Cann, Farrel & Savage, judgment of 27 Sept 1995, Series ANo. 324, 
21 EHRR97. 
20. Eur Court HR Ergi v. Turkey, judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV, § 83. 
21. Mc Cann judgment, op. cit. 
22. HARRIS, D . J . , O' BOYLE, C. WARBRICK, E. and BATES, Law of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 34 ff. 
23. Eur Court HR, Velikova v. Bulgaria, judgment of 18 May 2000, ECHR 2000-VI. 
24. Ibid 
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vincing explanation"25. Another interesting issue raised under Article 2 is the 
situation where a Contracting State expel a person (asylum seeker or refugee) 
to face the death penalty as this Article does not outlaw capital punishment. In 
Soering the Commission correctly provided that it can be a breach of Protocol 
n. 6 to the Convention to extradite or expel a person to another State where 
there is a real risk that the death penalty will be imposed26. It follows that the 
asylum seeker who would face capital charges or execution on return will thus 
be protected from expulsion in a State which has ratified Protocol n. 6. Finally, 
it is worthy questioning whether a rejection of core public benefits overall lead 
to degrading or inhuman treatment in contravention of the ECHR. Someone 
might eventually argue that a broad interpretation of the right to public benefits 
means that when a country on the whole denies economic and social benefits 
to asylum seekers, that nation may in fact violate its obligations against en-
gaging in inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3. This argument is 
considerably undermined when one considers the framework of Article 3. In-
deed, this Article includes language more geared toward a physical obligation 
by the State, warning against "torture", "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment". Defiance by a Contracting State of social and economic rights 
to asylum seekers may surely have an impact on their civil and political rights27; 
but, it is not likely to reach the severity of physical maltreatment by a nation 
that is the focus of Article 3. Such a limitation on the understanding of inhuman 
or degrading treatment creates difficulty in telling that a denial of public ben-
efits will result to something as severe as cruel or unusual punishment. Regard 
that an argument about an extensive reading of the ECHR can also be made in 
terms of the country's obligations under Article 2 concerning the right to life 
and this is precisely the reason of examining it here. Indeed, as the European 
Court has eloquently pointed out, the right to life should not be interpreted 
narrowly28. In avoiding a strict interpretation of the fundamental right to life, it 
would be advantageous for Contracting States to take all possible measures to 
establish support schemes of public benefits. This interpretation of the right to 
25. See Eur Court HR, Kismir v. Turkey, judgment 31 May 2005, 67 ECTHR, § 69. 
26. See Eur Court HR, Soering v. UK, judgment of 7 Julyl989, SeriesAno. 161.Accord-
ingly ECHR Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, judgment of 7 June 1990 [ 1991 ] EHRR, 1,1. 
27. Amplius CHOLEWTNSKI, R., "Economic and social rights of refugees and asylum seekers 
in Europe" (2000) 14 Georgetown Immig. L. J. 709, at 711. 
28. See Eur Court HR Osman v. United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, [1998] 
ECHR 101. Accordingly, see the Human Rights Committee's General Comment 6 on the right 
to life (art. 6), U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\l\Rev.l at 6 (1994), available via the UN treaties bodies 
website at http//www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf 
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life has led some to dispute that, if one's right to life encompasses public ben-
efits29, it might well embrace providing asylum seekers with basic social and 
economic benefits. In other terms, the key to this argument is that without social 
and economic rights, fundamental civil and political rights such as the right to 
life can not be fully enjoyed. Truly, restrictions on asylum seeker's ability to ac-
cess public benefits can seriously intrude upon key rights of asylum seekers in 
the Contracting States. In fact, allowing only those persons who seek asylum at 
a port of entry or immediately after entering the Contracting State to apply for 
public assistance may leave thousands with no help with living costs or access 
to housing. Whilst this result embodies a reasonable target of the Contracting 
States to restrain false asylum claims, it seems to arbitrary reject persons who 
do not instantaneously file for asylum, without objective guidelines to decide 
what filing asylum really signifies. As an alternative, an extensive interpretation 
of Article 2 indicates that Contracting States should draw precise guidelines 
to inform asylum seekers precisely when they would no longer be allowed for 
support, thereby allowing persons in genuine need of protection with feasible 
means of providing a claim of need for asylum. Indeed, it would be unfeasible 
to suppose persons fleeing maltreatment to provide clear and sound informa-
tion about their condition. While the argument has remarkable implications for 
the Italian or Maltese schemes which leaves asylum seekers nearly without 
any social and economic rights, the contention is probably too attenuated to 
have any real impact on a nation such as Italy. This, however, does not mean, 
of course, that Italy and Malta should not recognize the relevance of economic 
and social rights as fundamental human rights of asylum seekers. Clearly, the 
two sets of rights are strictly correlated to one another, having been so enumer-
ated in the ECHR. Undeniably, it is difficult to predict how one might take 
advantage of the right to seek asylum, explicitly or implicitly admitted in the 
prevalence of Contracting States, without being guaranteed at least an adequate 
standard of living and the right to work while awaiting a decision on whether a 
grant of asylum has been accepted. Whilst no specific obligations in the ECHR 
explicitly bind Contracting States to provide economic and social benefits to 
asylum seekers, the fact that the country's obligation to this exposed group can 
be questioned under this instrument makes it all the more critical that a govern-
ment issue a comprehensible reply indicating how its asylum scheme complies 
with its international obligations. 
29. See Eur Comm HRXv Ireland, App. No. 6839/74 [1976] 7 Eur. Comm'n H.R Dec. & 
Rep 78, where the need for appropriate public health measures to safeguard life, without which 
Article 2 could be deprived of its efficacy was recognised. 
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3.2. The Compatibility of Detention of Asylum Seekers with Article 5 
It is almost a communis opinio that the practice of detaining asylum seek-
ers in specialised immigration centres or in the prison system has to be regarded 
either as a prominent example of a restriction aimed at deterrence and one of 
the most significant pressure to their well being30. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 
arbitrary use of detention appears to conflict with a variety of international legal 
provisions which stem principally from human rights law. A good example of 
such provisions is Article 5 (1) (f) of the ECHR which establishes that immigra-
tion detention can be justified specifically to prevent unauthorised entry and to 
detain a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation 
or extradition. 
In Saadi v. United Kingdom the Court accepted that a detention of an asy-
lum seeker for 7 days to facilitate the examination of the case was justified 
under Article 5 (1) (f)31. The rationale behind this decision, prima facie out of 
line with the Convention, is that this was considered a necessary adjunct to the 
right of States to control aliens'entry and residence that States are allowed to 
detain would be immigrants who have applied for permission to enter, whether 
by way of asylum or not. It follows that until the State has authorised entry, 
any access is "unauthorised" and detention is thus permissible under Article 
5 (1) (f), only provided that such detention is not arbitrary (i.e. carried out in 
good faith, closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry, 
the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, and the duration 
should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued)32. If you 
apply the same reasoning to the detention of children seeking asylum, you can 
come to the absurd conclusion, contrary to what is the international consensus 
that these subjects must not be detained, that the ECHR does not prohibit such 
treatment unless it is arbitrary or lengthy33. 
Having outlined above that Article 5 (1) (f) permits detention in order to 
arrest illegal entry to a Contracting State or prior to deportation, even though 
30. Amplius O'NIONS, H , "No Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for Ad-
ministrative Convenience" (2008) 10 European Journal of Migration and Law 149 ff. 
31. Eur Court HR Saadi v. UK, judgment of 11 July 2006, upheld by Grand Chamber judg-
ment of 29 January 2008 [2008] ECHR 79. For a full account of this case see H. O'NIONS, "No 
Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for Administrative Convenience" (2008) 2 
European Journal of Migration and Lawl49 ff. 
32. The Court held that informing the applicant's lawyer of the reason for the detention of 
his client after 7 hours of detention was in conflict with the requirement under Article 5 (2) to 
provide such information promptly. 
33. See FOR™, J., "Rights Brought Home for Children" (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 350 ff. 
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subject to some restrictions, the next issue is to establish what the right to lib-
erty and security of a person as embodied in Article 5 of the ECHR implies. 
Even though very few decisions involving asylum seekers have been brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of this Article, some 
fundamental principles have been acknowledged in a number of landmark 
judgements and admissibility decisions. In Amuur v. France the Court first de-
termined if holding aliens in an airport transit zone could be regarded as a dep-
rivation of liberty. In that decision it clearly explained that: "the mere fact that it 
is possible for asylum seekers to leave voluntarily the country where they wish 
to take refuge cannot exclude a restriction on liberty"34. So, in the case at stake, 
where the applicants were four Somali nationals who were held in the Paris 
Orly Airport transit zone for 20 days, the Court observed that: "holding the 
applicants in the transit zone... was equivalent in practice, in view of the restric-
tions suffered, to a deprivation of liberty"35. On the subsequent issue whether 
such a deprivation of liberty fulfilled the judicial guarantees of Article 5 of the 
ECHR, including the requirement that this deprivation has a legal foundation 
in domestic law and be subject to judicial review, in the same decision, it stated 
that: "... though the applicants were not in France... holding them in the inter-
national zone of Paris Orly Airport made them subject to French law as this one 
does not have extraterritorial status"36. Furthermore, and more significantly, by 
arguing from the circumstance that the internal legislation in force at the time 
was dealing badly with the issue of detention in the transit zone and thus can 
not represent a "law" of sufficient "quality" the Court rightly concluded for the 
existence of a violation of Article 5 (l) 3 7 . 
The question of the lawfulness of the detention either on the ground of its 
length and with regard to the guarantees against arbitrariness provided by the 
legal system in the UK was duly examined inter alia in Chahal v. United King-
dom, where the European Court, on the specific issue of the lawfulness of de-
tention and its length, pointed out correctly that: "any deprivation of liberty un-
der Article 5(1) (f) will be justified only for as long as deportation proceedings 
are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the 
detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 (1) (f)"38. Even more in-
terestingly, with regard to the delicate issue "whether the available proceedings 




38. Eur Court HR Chahal v. United Kingdom, judgment of 15 November 1996, 23 EHRR 
413, §113. 
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to challenge the lawfulness of the applicant's detention and to seek bail pro-
vided an adequate control by the domestic courts" it observed that, as national 
security was involved, the domestic courts were not in a position to review 
all the elements of the decision to detain the applicant39. It either emphasised 
that: "as the use of confidential material may be unavoidable where national 
security is at stake. This does not mean, however, that the national authorities 
can be free from effective control by the domestic courts whenever they choose 
to assert that national security and terrorism are involved"(emphasis added)40. 
Indeed, this is a rather important statement as it allowed the Court to maintain 
that: "neither the proceedings for habeas corpus and for judicial review of the 
decision to detain the applicant before the domestic courts, nor the advisory 
panel procedure, satisfied the requirements of Article 5, par. 4, which provides 
that who is deprived of his liberty by detention or arrest shall be allowed to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speed-
ily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is unlawful "(emphasis 
added)41. That said, it is worth underscoring that Article 5 (4) does not clarify in 
objective terms whether the absence of an oral hearing and the lack of access to 
the applicant's file in the proceedings he instituted concerning the lawfulness of 
his detention is equivalent or not to a violation of it. But some clarifications on 
this issue as well as the meaning and ratio iuris of this provision can be found 
in Yavuz v. Austria, where the Court ruled out that Article 5 (4) can not be inter-
preted as imposing on the domestic authorities a duty: "to institute exchanges of 
documents which would render impossible to take a decision within the statu-
tory time-limit" (emphasis added).42 This is as the: "proceedings for review of 
an arrest or a detention with a view to expulsion are urgent matters which have 
to be dealt with speedily"43. 
3.3. The Rights Of Asylum Seekers To Private And Family Life 
Article 8, paragraph 1, provides that: "Everyone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence". 
The language of this Article shows that it belongs to the category of "quali-
fied rights", that is, rights which may be limited under the conditions spelt out in 
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Article 8 (2)44. Contracting States have, therefore, a wide margin of appreciation 
as to the manner in which they implement Article 8 4 5. Whilst there is no unified 
approach regarding a right to family unit or what family protection encompasses 
in much scholarly literature the right to "family life" or to "family" are treated 
synonymously with the right to "family unit"46. This is compelling as family unit 
is truly a subset or characteristic of having a family life. Indeed, for many asylum 
or refugee families, in order to enjoy a family life, the unit of the family is their 
critical concern. This may require not solely that States desist from action that 
would result in family divisions, but either that they take measures to maintain the 
unity of the family and reunite family members who have been separated. 
The circumstance that there is no right to enter, reside or immigrate, or 
to be granted asylum, in European human rights law poses a direct conflict 
with the right to family life in two particular instances: (a) where an asylum 
seeker wishes to marry a foreign spouse in order to found a family; or b) where 
family members are separated during asylum flight. The approach adopted by 
several Contracting States in carefully securing the entry of non nationals into 
their territory can be considered as a grave interference with an individual's 
fundamental right to family life47. ECHR refers not solely to families already 
constitutes, but explicitly protects the right to marriage and to form a family, 
which is, future families48. 
Moving now to more specific issues, it should be recalled that Article 8 
(1) protects the nuclear family structure (children, spouses, parents), but also 
other forms of family ties49. In Marckx v. Belgium the Court emphasised that: 
"... family life, within the meaning of Article 8, includes at least the ties be-
4 4 . See ex multis MOCK, H., "Le droit au respect de la vie privee et familiale, du domicile 
et de la correspondence (art. 8, Conv. EDH) á l'aube du XXI siécle. Apercu de la jurisprudence 
de la Commission et de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme" ( 1 9 9 8 ) 1 Rev. Univ. Dr. 
Homme 2 3 7 ff. 
4 5 . On the doctrine of the margin of appreciation see ex multis ARAI-TAKAHASHI, Y., The 
margin of appreciation doctrine and the principle of proportionality in the jurisprudence of 
the ECHR (Antwerp [etc.]: Intersentia, 2 0 0 2 ) ; HUTCHINSON, M.R., "The margin of appreciation 
doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights" 4 8 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ICLQ 6 3 8 ff. 
46. ¿¿?¿¿¿ 
4 7 . See PROBERT, R. (ed), Family life and the law: under one roof (Aldershot, Ashgate, 
2 0 0 7 ) 2 3 6 . 
4 8 . See STALFORD, H , "Concepts of Family under EU Law - Lessons from the ECHR" 
( 2 0 0 2 ) 1 6 ( 3 ) International Journal of Law, Policy and the FamilyAXQ ff; 
4 9 . Amplius LIDDY, J., "The concept of Family Lifes Under the ECHR", European Hu-
man Rights Law Review, 1 (1998) , 1, 1 5 ff; O'DONNELL, "Protection of Family Life: Positive 
Approaches and the ECHR" ( 1 9 9 5 ) 17(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 2 6 1 ff; 
MCGLYNN, C , Families and the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2 0 0 6 ) 1 6 . 
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tween near relatives, for instance those between grandparents and grandchil-
dren, since such relatives may play a considerable part in family life"50. Again, 
in Yilamz v. Germany it stressed that the protection of Article 8 applies to adults 
if it is demonstrated that there is a subsidiary connection, other than the accus-
tomed affective bonds51. Furthermore, it maintained that the concept of "family 
life" could also include "intended" family life, which is, one's fiancé(e)52. This 
is a very broad interpretation of Article 8, § 1 that is, at the outset, questionable. 
Indeed this is not what you can draw from a literal or systematic reading of this 
provision which rather suggests that this Article protects vested rights better 
than prospective ones53. Nevertheless, it appears to be perfectly in line with the 
ECHR as interpreted in the light of its main jurisprudence. More specifically, 
this is supported by the so called "elsewhere" or "connections" test developed 
in respect of family reunification cases to this situation54. Where the applicant 
is part of a cultural or a minority ethnic group in the host community, then it is 
also plausible to expect that she or he will find a suitable spouse in that com-
munity. That is, his or her status as an asylum seeker might suggest that without 
marrying a foreign spouse, he or she will not be able to enjoy the right to marry 
or to form a family elsewhere. On the contrary, where the "intended" spouse 
is known to the family before their arrangements for marriage were in place 
but were interrupted, it is also arguable that residence and entry are required in 
order to effect the marriage55. 
From asylum seeker and refugee's perspective, the relevance of this provi-
sion lies in the fact that the European Court has interpreted Article 8 in a way 
that protects family members of non nationals durably established in Contract-
ing States against expulsion and allows for their possible reunification56. This 
50. Eur Court HRAfarc/hrv.Be/gi'wm, judgment of 13 June 1979, SerieAno. 31,2EHRR330. 
51. Eur Court HR, Tilamzv. Germany, judgment of 17 April 2003 (unreported). 
52. Eur Court HR,Abdulaziz and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, Serie A no. 94 (1985) 50. 
53. Accordingly ATKINSON SANFORD, D., European Human Rights Mechanisms, in FITZ-
PATRICK, J. (ed.), Human Rights Protection for Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Dis-
placed Persons (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001) 411. 
54. See LAMBERT, H , "The European Court of Human Rights and the right of refugees and 
other persons in need of protection to family reunion" (1999) 11 URL 427-450. 
55. For these remarks see EDWARDS, A., "Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right "To En-
joy" Asylum" (2005) 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 317, who, with specific reference 
to refugees, observes that: "It is not always the case that the country of refuge is the most desir-
able location, although it would be important that wherever the couple are granted the right to 
reside, the refugee is able to maintain the level of protection required of his or her status as a 
refugee". 
56. See CLARK, T., "Human Rights and Expulsion: Giving Contentto the Concept of Asy-
lum", URL, 4 (1992), 189 at 193. 
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interpretation of Article 8 makes this provision potentially applicable inter alia 
to recognised refugees, and to persons enjoying temporary protection or other 
forms of complementary protection. It must be noted, however, that insofar as 
family reunification involves immigration issues, the Court has taken a rather 
restrictive interpretation of the provisions of Article 8 by setting up stringent 
conditions to its applicability57. In short, it will seek to determine whether there 
is anything preventing the family from returning to life in the country of origin 
with the other elements of the family who are trying to come in the State party 
to the ECHR. This "returnability" test is steadily applied58. If it is ascertained 
that the entire family may in reality reunite in the country of origin, the Court 
will not find a contravention of Article 8. This jurisprudence was also applied 
in the case of GUI v. The Netherlands, concerning a Turkish national living in 
Switzerland with a residence permit delivered on humanitarian grounds59. In 
that case, the European Court found that the refusal to grant family reunifica-
tion for the child who remained in Turkey did not constitute a violation of Ar-
ticle 8. It consequently ruled out that: "although Mr and Mrs Gül are lawfully 
resident in Switzerland, they do not have a permanent right of abode as they 
do not have a settlement permit but merely a residence permit on humanitarian 
grounds, which could be withdrawn, and which under Swiss law does not give 
them a right to family reunion"60. However, as the circumstances of the case 
revealed that the applicant's asylum application was rejected in first instance 
by the Swiss authorities and that following the issuance of the residence permit 
on humanitarian grounds he went at least twice to Turkey to visit his son, the 
Court observed that: "... while acknowledging that the Gül family's situation 
is very difficult from the human point of view", Switzerland has not failed to 
fulfil the obligation arising under Article 8(1), and there has, thus, been no 
interference in the applicant's family life within the meaning of that Article"61. 
But one can easily argued that asylum seekers as well as other subjects in need 
of international protection living in a Contracting State of the ECHR will fail 
the test of "returnability" to the country of origin applied by the Court in such 
cases. Therefore, if a request for family reunion is withdrawn by national au-
57. See Eur Court HR Sen v. The Netherlands, judgment 21 December 2001 (2001) 12 
(11-12) Human Rights Case Digest 963-965(3). 
58. See UNHCR, Manual on Refugee Protection and the ECHR (Regional Bureau for Eu-
rope- Department of International Protection, April 2003), Part. 2.3 - Fact Sheet on Article 8,4. 
59. Eur Court HR, Gül v. The Netherlands, judgment of 19 February 1996, Appl. No. 
10730/84, par. 21. 
60. Ibidem, par. 41, emphasis added. 
61. Ibidem, par. 43. 
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thorities, they might start proceedings before it, demonstrating that the return to 
the country of origin is rather difficult or more likely impossible62. 
The Court introduced some adjustments to this too restrictive jurispru-
dence in Sein v. The Netherlands, where it stated that the refusal to allow a Tur-
key minor child to join her Turkish parents residing legally in the Netherlands 
represented a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR63. Surely, this decision was 
justified either by the major obstacles to the return of the whole family to Tur-
key and the circumstance that in addition to having a long term resident permit, 
the parents lived in the Netherlands for a long period of time. Nevertheless, it 
shows the existence of a different attitude of the Court in family reunification 
cases as demonstrated by the fact that for this to recognize a violation of Article 
8 it should carry out a critical survey of the situation of the applicant. In other 
words, to establish whether or not the family could return to the country of 
origin to reunite with the member wishing to join them, one has to deem the 
duration of stay in the host State, the cultural connection and the age of the 
minor who persisted in being in the country of origin, etc. In Moustaquin v. 
Belgium the Court held that the expulsion of long term immigrants and second 
generation foreigners constitutes an interference with their family life. It sig-
nificantly stated that: "... in cases where the relevant decisions would constitute 
an interference with the rights protected by paragraph 1 of Article 8, they must 
be shown to be "necessary in a democratic society", that is to say justified by 
a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued"64. But only in Amrollahi v. Denmark it gave a record of the criteria 
that it takes into consideration to ascertain whether an expulsion is propor-
tionate, i.e. necessary in a democratic society. Among these, one may briefly 
recall the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; 
the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct 
during that period; the applicant's family situation, such as the duration of the 
marriage, the possibility of the family members following the expulsion to the 
country of destination65. The outcome of the aforementioned cases suggests 
62. On this issue see the excellent analysis of CLEMENTUCCI, F., The Right to Family Re-
unification: between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. 
A particular attention to the rights of Third Country Nationals (TCNS) (College of Europe 
Publishing, 2004) 3 ff. 
63. See supra note 57. 
64. Eur Court H R , Moustaquin v. Belgium, judgment of 18 February 1991, Application No. 
12313/86, par. 43. 
65. Eur Court HR, Amrollahi v. Denmark, judgment of 11 July 2002, Application No 
56811/00 (unreported). 
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that for Article 8 to apply to an expulsion case involving specifically an asylum 
seeker or more generally a person in need of international protection this would 
have to be argued on the basis of the consequences of the expulsion measure on 
the individual's private or family life on the territory of the contracting party, if 
he or she has been there long enough to develop a private or family life. But this 
implies, as the UNHCR pointed out correctly, that if harmful consequences are 
feared in the country of origin, it would be better to base the application before 
the Court on Article 3 of the ECHR66. Noticeably, this would leave the ques-
tion open whether the application of Article 8 in family reunion cases would be 
useful at the end to asylum seekers. Being the family reunion the only practical 
means of giving effect to the right to family life in the case of separated asylum 
or refugee families one could eventually give a positive answer to this query 
as the: "refusal to allow family reunification may be considered an interference 
with the right to family life or to family unit, especially where the family has 
no realistic possibilities of enjoying that right elsewhere"67. Indeed, at least in 
States where family reunion of these categories of aliens is restrictively admin-
istered, the demurral to allow such reunion can be regarded a grave hindrance 
to the right to family life. But a different outcome could be deduced from the 
general principle, well summarised in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. 
United Kingdom6* and more recently in Nasri v. France, that: "... a State has 
the right to control the entry of non nationals into its territory"69. 
Based on the foregoing, one could maintain that claims under Article 8 
may be reasonably brought only when the impugned treatment does not rise 
to the level of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but still 
constitutes an interference with an individual's right to personal and physical 
integrity. Similar conclusions are suggested by the case of X and Y v. The Neth-
66. See UNHCR, supra, note 57, "Fact Sheet on Article 3", note 18. 
67. UNHCR, "Summary Conclusions on Family Unit", Global Consultations on Interna-
tional Protection, Geneva Expert Roundtable 8-9 Nov. 2001, organised by the UNHCR and 
the Graduate Institute of International Studies, para. 5. See also EDWARDS, A., "Human Rights, 
Refugees, and the Right "to Enjoy" Asylum", International Journal of Refugee Law, 2005, 11, 
who correctly states that: "this so called "elsewhere" approach, largely developed by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, offers support to the plight of refugee families, either those seek-
ing reunification of separated family members or those facing deportation and or expulsion". 
ROGERS, N., "Immigration and the European Convention on Human Rights: Are New Principles 
Emerging?" (2003) 1 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53-64. 
68. See Eur Court HR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, Application 
nos. 9214/80; 9473/81; 9474/81, Judgment 28 May 1985, Ser. A, No. 94. 
69. See Eur Court HR, Aten v. France, judgment of 13 July 1995, Ser.Ano. 320-B, p. 25, 
§41. 
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erlands, where the Court held that any forced physical treatment of an indi-
vidual amounts to an interference with private life70. But this is only whether 
the interference affects the well being of the applicant. Indeed, actions that were 
expected or impliedly consensual do not implicate Article 8. Of tremendous 
relevance to all asylum seekers, is that this Article may be raised in the context 
of a medical claim. Despite the fact that the ECHR is silent with regard to the 
right to an adequate standard of health and health care it is generally accepted 
that provisions for medical care are implicit in certain norms such as Article 8, 
which protects the right to physical and psychological integrity as component 
part of the general right to respect for private life71. This, in addition to re-
fraining from interfering with this right, may require the State to take positive 
measures to respect it. In particular, where the State has an obligation to pro-
vide medical care, an excessive delay of the public health service in providing 
a medical service to which the patient is entitled may raise an issue under the 
Convention. In order to rely on Article 8 in this way, the patient would have 
to establish that the delay has, or is likely to have, a serious impact on his/ 
her health72. In addition, where the failure to provide medical services would 
result in a life threatening situation, this might raise an issue under the right to 
life under Article 2, or under Article 3, which prohibits inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment. Compulsory medical treatment, however minor, may constitute 
an interference with the right to respect for private life73. But such treatment 
will not infringe the Convention as long as there is proportionality between 
the interference which it creates and the need to protect the public interest that 
it serves. This might be particularly important where asylum seekers are con-
cerned because they have limited possibilities to protect their own rights. 
The issue in an Article 8 foreign case is whether return will result in a 
real risk of a flagrant denial of an applicant's Article 8 rights in the country of 
return, usually in respect of the applicant's right to physical and moral integ-
rity. When considering if return would give rise to a risk of a flagrant breach 
of Article 8 decision makers should take into account related factors as for an 
70. See ATKINSON SANFORD, D., supra note 11, at 382. 
71. WICKS, E., "The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention 
on Human Rights", Medical Law Review, 9 (2001), 17-40; SEATZU, E, "Sulla detenzione ed il 
trattamento sanitario coattivo di soggetti malati di mente alia luce della Convenzione europea 
dei diritti dell'uomo", Rivista della cooperazione giuridica internazionale, 17 (2004), 40 ff. 
72. See Eur Comm. HR, Passanante v. Italy, Decision of 1 s t of December 1998, 26 EHRR 
CD 13. 
73. See Eur. Comm. HR, JR, GR, RR&YRv. Switzerland, Decision of 5th of April 1995, 
DR81A, 61. 
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Article 3 medical claim. But one can not disregard, to quote the House of Lords 
in Razgar, that: "it is not easy to think of a foreign health care which would 
fail under Article 3 but succeed under Article 8"7 4. This is also because unlike 
Article 3 Article 8 is a qualified right, which means that interference with the 
rights set out in Article 8 (1) may only be allowed in certain circumstances. A 
clear illustration of this is in Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, where the European 
Court established that the rejection of the applicant's asylum application and 
the ensuring decision to remove her to Uganda would not give rise to a viola-
tion inter alia of Article 8, guaranteeing the right to private and family life, 
of the ECHR75. This was justified as her proposed removal to Uganda was in 
accordance with the law and justified by a legitimate aim, namely the mainte-
nance and enforcement of immigration control. Even more interestingly, as to 
the necessity of the interference, it, unanimously, found in the aforesaid deci-
sion that any private life that the applicant had established during her stay in 
the United Kingdom when balanced against the legitimate public interest in 
effective immigration control would not render for removal a disproportionate 
interference76. 
3.4. Freedom of Religion and Asylum Seekers 
Very little guidance is available from the European Court in relation to 
the exercise by an individual seeking asylum in a Contracting State of his/her 
religious freedom, though existing case law shows that it is rather arduous to 
make out a successful claim under Article 9 of the ECHR which provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion and thought. A clear 
demonstration of this may be found in Zand Tv. UK, where the Court declared 
the application inadmissible, though it was not evident whether there was the 
possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, there might be protection against 
refoulement on the basis of Article 9 where the person would run a real risk of 
flagrant violation of that provision in the receiving State77. This finding was 
echoed in Asian v. Malta. Here, the applicant, a Turkish national, who was de-
nied entry in Malta because of an alleged problem with his return visa to Libya, 
74. See House of Lords, R (Razgar) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (The 
Times June 21,2004 [2004] 2 AC 368). 
75. See Eur Court HR, Nnyanzi v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 23 April 2008, Applica-
tion No 21878/06 [2008] 47 E.H.R.R. 17. 
76. Ibidem, par. 76. 
77. See Eur Court HR, Z. and T. v. UK, admissibility decision of 28 February 2006 (applica-
tion declared inadmissible). 
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claimed that the crucial issues of the intention for denying him leave to enter 
was on account of his religion78. Notwithstanding the circumstance that this 
plea was not at least prima facie ill-founded, the Court considered unnecessary 
to address this argument as it was clear from the major facts of the case that: 
"the documentation produced by the applicant at the border control point raised 
in the minds of the port officials suspicions about the sincerity of his reasons 
for entering the country"79. 
That said, it is worth underscoring that the freedom of religion includes 
the right to manifest belief through worship, teaching, observance and practice 
as well as the freedom to change religion, though a restriction may be placed 
on the freedom to manifest one's religious beliefs in certain situations80. But 
Article 9 does not lay out any specific restriction on the right of asylum seek-
ers to enjoy such rights. Of inestimable relevance to children seeking asylum 
is that the ECHR seems to foresee a parental responsibility in the exercise by 
the child of his/her freedom of religion and in particular, Article 2 of the First 
Protocol demands Member States to value the religious beliefs of parents in the 
teaching of their family81. Though the purpose of this provision is to defend the 
infant from religious propaganda by the State, rather than the defence of the 
religious reliability of individual pupils, it is also considered important that any 
instruction the infant receives from the State leaves the possibility for parental 
supervision82. In addition, the duty to defence the religious beliefs of parents 
in the exercise of their children's teaching applies as element of the exercise 
of parental task. Therefore, the right to decide a child's spiritual schooling is 
deemed to be an intrinsic part of the fundamental right of custody, which can 
be surrendered along with other parental responsibilities in certain conditions83. 
Equally of great relevance in the asylum sector is the qualification by the 
European Court of the prohibition of a particular religious practice under do-
mestic law as an unjustifiable interference with religious freedom84. As a result, 
78. See Eur Court HR, Asian v. Malta, Appl. No. 29493/95, Judgment of 3"1 of February 
2000. 
79. UNCHR, supra, note 57,12. 
80. See EVANS, C , Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford, OUP, 2001) 10 ff. 
81. See Eur. Court HR, Olson v. Sweden, Judgment of 24 March 1988, Serie A, n. 130, § 95. 
82. See Eur. Court HR, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen & Pedersen v. Denmark, Judgment of 7 
December 1976, Series A, n. 23, 1 EHRR 711 § 53. 
83. See Eur. Comm. HR, X v. UK, Decision of 14 th of December 1972, Collection 44, 66. 
84. See Eur. Court. HR, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Judgment of 29 June 2004, Application no. 
44774/98 [2005] ECtHR (GC) 819. For a commentary EVANS, C , "The 'Islamic Scarf' in the 
European Court of Human Rights" (2006) 4 MelbJIL 52. See also NIGRO, R., "II margine di ap-
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it is now settled that Article 9 can not be invoked in order to justify a practice 
that is contrary to national law. Reasoning backward from this point, although 
the practice of marrying very young undoubtedly reflected the manifestation of 
a particular religious faith, the fact that the internal legislation consistent with 
the Convention granted protection for the rights and health of young people in 
such situations signified that, indirectly, a restriction was placed on the freedom 
of religion to this end. More generally on the restrictions set out in Article 9, 
§ 2, it is worth underscoring that these apply to the demonstration of religious 
credence, and not to the freedom to choose religion itself. 
3.5. Freedom of Association in Asylum Context 
In addition to Articles 2, 5, 8, 9 and 12, asylum seekers can benefit from 
other ECHR provisions in order to reinforce their social and economic rights. 
It is arguable that denying asylum seekers basic social and economic rights 
and freedoms might represent constructive refoulement°5. Not solely could the 
lack of social and economic rights in a certain destination country threaten to 
discourage individuals from seeking asylum from maltreatment there, but it 
can act as a push issue in which asylum seekers, out of economic necessity, are 
forced to return to a country in which their freedom or life could be menaced. 
Having asserted that, and on the same line of reasoning, one can not underesti-
mated that the relationship between economic and social rights and freedoms, 
on one hand, and civil and political rights, on the other, is of key relevance in 
the asylum context. 
Moving to more specific issues, a plain reading of Article 11 ECHR would 
suggest that this provision strives for the protection of the right of individuals to: 
"come together for the expression and protection of their common interests"86. 
It is, therefore, applicable to situations in which the right to demonstrate or to 
join a trade union are at issue, rather than any right to spontaneously associ-
ate with whomever one desires. In Platform "Artzte für das Leben " v. Austria 
the Court lucidly explained that Article 11 does not demand Member States to 
guarantee totally that demonstrations will take place without interference87. In 
prezzamento e la giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti umani sul velo islámico" (2008) 
2 Diritti umani e Diritto internazionale 71 ff. 
85. See EDWARDS, A., supra note 55. 
86. See VAN DIJK, P. & VAN HOOF, G.J.H., supra note 17, 586 ff. 
87. See Eur. Court HR, Platform "Artzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, Judgment of 21 June 
1988,Appl.No. 139 [1991] 13EHRR204. 
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the aforementioned decision - though counter-demonstrators interrupted the 
manifestation in question, as no demonstrators suffered any cruelty to their per-
son - it held that the State had adopted appropriate protective measures within 
the scope of its discretion to defend the marchers since these measures were 
"reasonable" to warrant that lawful demonstrations may progress calmly88. 
Again, a literal interpretation of Article 11 also indicates that this encompasses 
inter alia a right for individuals to associate: "in order to attain various ends". 
It follows that any restriction imposed on the activities of individuals seeking 
asylum, either by the State or a private party, will be unlikely to raise an issue 
under this provision unless it is established that their gathering serves a specific 
aim. Yet, the wording of this provision suggests that the right to association, 
which embraces freedom to associate and opt not to associate89, at least in prin-
ciple, applies to nationals and non nationals alike. This conclusion can be de-
rived either from a plain reading of Article 11 and the non discrimination basis 
of ECHR generally. It is though subject to a number of restricting conditions 
factors under Article 11 § 2 which need to be narrowly interpreted and applied 
in light of the specific circumstances in the country of asylum. 
While there have been a small number of particular applications brought 
by asylum seekers challenging their right to association, there is clearly sub-
stantial possibilities of implementing Article 11 of the ECHR in this area. In-
deed, the positive obligation to adopt "reasonable and appropriate" measures 
to ensure that lawful demonstrations can proceed peacefully has significant 
repercussions to asylum seekers in their asylum country. But one can even-
tually derive the importance of Article 11 to political asylum seekers either 
from the Court's approach in the case of Ózdep v. Turkey, where this held 
that: "the fact that... a political project is considered incompatible with the 
current principles and structures of the Turkish State does not mean that it 
infringes democratic rules. It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse 
political projects to be proposed and debated, even those that call into ques-
tion the way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm 
democracy itself'90. 
88. See CLEMENTS, L. et al., European Human Rights: Taking a Case under the Convention 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) 75. 
89. See SEATZU, F., "La liberta negativa di associazione e la Convenzione europea dei diritti 
deH'uomo" La Comunitá Internazionale, 2008, p. 301 ff; Nowrz, T, "Negative Freedom of As-
sociation: Gustafsson v. Sweden" (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 79. 
90. See ECHR, OZDEP v. Turkey, Judgment of 8 December 1999, App. No. 23885/94 
[2001] 27 EHRR 674. 
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3.6. The Rights Of Asylum Seekers To Marry And To Found A Family 
Of tremendous significance to all asylum seekers of marriageable age are 
the rights, encompassed in Article 12 of the ECHR, to marry and to found a 
family. 
Though these can truly regarded as being of special importance in asylum 
context you can not find detailed case law on these provisions and asylum seek-
ers. At first glance, indeed, this is an unexpected outcome which, however, can 
be easily understood if one rightly considers that Article 12 refers to marriages 
contracted according to "national laws". This, in fact, implies that Contracting 
States have no positive duty to allow marriage in any particular form, nor to 
uphold it in any way. Furthermore, this is also the true reason as that Article 12 
does not require the Contracting State to allow marriages according to a par-
ticular religious ceremony91. However, as it has been lucidly stated in Van Oost-
erwijk v. Belgium, a law that makes for asylum seekers impossible to marry 
because of the religious, social or ethnic group to which they belong, violates 
the ECHR if this is arbitrary or eventually deprive the fundamental rights to 
marry or to found a family of theirs content92. 
Moving to the relationship between Article 12 and the so called "marriages 
of convenience" it is well known that for some years there has been a growing 
difficulty with what are normally referred to as "marriages of convenience", 
which may be classified as marriages concluded between persons in a Contract-
ing State who are subject to immigration control and other persons already 
present and settled in the same State for the purpose of securing an immigration 
advantage, i.e. the right to remain in that country. The problem lies that such 
marriages have been usually perceived as deceptions by registrars celebrating 
at them by such unconcealed signs as the fact that the two parties did not know 
each other, that they did not speak the same language or that they gave con-
fused informations of each other's respective personal histories and status. In 
the Baiai case the House of Lords addressed the issue whether section 19 of the 
Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 breach Article 12 of the ECHR93. Art. 19 
of the 2004 Act required the superintendent registrar to whom notice of such a 
marriage was given to satisfy himself: 1 that the person subject to immigration 
91. See HARRIS, D.J., O'BOYLE, M. , WARBRICK, C. y BATES, E., Law of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 436. 
92. See Eur. Comm. HR, Van Oosterwijk v. ñe/gróm,Judgment of 16th of July 1979, Appl. 
no. 7654/76, Serie A, 40 (1980). 
93. See House of Lords, R (Baiai) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] 1 
A.C. 287 (HL). 
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control had been given entry approval expressly for the reason of enabling him/ 
her to marry in the UK; or 2 that person had the written authorization of the 
Secretary of State to marry in UK, or 3. that person fell within a class having 
such a authorization as a result of regulations made by the Secretary of State. 
On the ground that the discrepancy subsequently established in this section was 
that it was mandatory in relation to marriages to be solemnised by a superin-
tendent registrar but not in relations to marriages to be solemnised by a minister 
of the Church of England this section found to be discriminatory in a case prior 
than the case under deliberation and consequently to that extent mismatched 
with Article 13 of the ECHR94. However, the House of Lords maintained that 
section 19 of the 2004 Act was not open to objection on the ground of incom-
patibility with the ECHR rights to marry and to found a family. In the words 
of Lord Bingham: "It is open to a Member State consistently with Article 12 to 
seek to prevent marriages of convenience"95. 
3.7. The Right Of Asylum Seekers To An Effective Remedy Before A National 
Authority 
Article 13 reads as follows: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity". 
The meaning of this provision in asylum cases can be deduced a contrario 
from the circumstance that Article 6 of the ECHR, which provides the right to 
a fair trial, is not applicable to immigration and asylum issues, as the right to 
enter and reside in a country is not a "civil right" within the meaning of the 
provision96. Thus, Article 13 remains the only provision that may be applied 
to reinforce the protections of refugee status determination procedures. Yet, 
the procedural principles arising from the European Court's case law and its 
interpretation of Article 13 could be adopted in order to address other issues 
concerning the refugee status determination procedures, such as expedited pro-
94. For a fuller account of this see MIGRATION WATCH UK LEGAL, Recent case law involving 
consideration of the European convention on human rights, at http://www.migrationwatchuk. 
com/briefingPaper/document/86 
95. Ibidem. 
96. But see App. no. 10523/02 Coorplan-Jenny Gmdtt and Hascic v. Austria and App. No. 
62539/00 Jurisic v. Austria, where the Court held that Article 6 ECHR did apply to an immigra-
tion related matter, namely the issue of employment permits, as these determined the validity of 
any subsequent employment contract and hence concern civil rights. 
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cedures. But before considering how the European Court's jurisprudence on 
Article 13 could be employed in asylum law, it is appropriate to scrutinize the 
interpretation that the Court has taken to the different parts of this provision. 
It is trite law that Contracting States to the ECHR must set up such mecha-
nisms or open existing ones only with regard to arguable claims. This is clearly 
stated in Boyle and Rice v. United Kingdom, where the Court tersely provided 
that: "Article 13 cannot be interpreted as to require a remedy in domestic law 
in respect of any supposed grievance under the Convention that an individual 
may have, no matter how unmeritorious his complaint may be: the grievance 
must be an arguable one in terms of the Convention" (emphasis added)97. But 
this Article may not be read as to urge any special form of remedy. As the Court 
commented in Klass and Others v. Germany: "... the authority referred to in 
Article 13 can not necessarily in all instances be a judicial authority in the 
strict sense". Nevertheless, as it observed in the aforementioned decision, it is 
equally evident that: "the powers and procedural guarantees an authority pos-
sesses are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective"98. 
Some problems might arise as Article 13 does not contain a definition of the no-
tion of an "arguable" claim. But these should not be overestimated as the Court 
has in its jurisprudence drawn a very useful parallel between that notion and 
the concept of "well foundness". Take, for example, the case of Boyle and Rice 
v. United Kingdom, where it established that: "... rejection of a complaint as 
manifestly ill founded amounts to a decision that there is not even a prima facie 
case against the respondent State. On the ordinary meaning of the words, it is 
difficult to conceive how a claim that is manifestly ill founded can neverthe-
less be arguable, and vice versa"99. Even more explicitly, in Powell and Reyner 
v. United Kingdom the Court asserted that: "the term "manifestly ill founded" 
extends further than the literal meaning of the word "manifest" would suggest 
at first reading"100. Yet, in the aforementioned case it found that: "some serious 
claims might give rise to a prima facie issue but, after "full examination" at the 
admissibility stage, ultimately be rejected as manifestly ill founded notwith-
standing their arguable character"101. Self evidently, all these statements of the 
97. See ECHR, Boyle and Rice v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A 
no. 131,23. 
98. See ECHR, Klass and others v Federal Republic of Germany, 6 September 1978, 
Series A, [1979-80] 2 EHRR 214, par. 67. 
99. para. 57 (emphasis added). 
100. See ECHR, Powell And Rayner v. The United Kingdom, Judgment 21 February 1990, 
Appl. n. 3/1989/163/219, Serie A, 172 [1990] 12 EHRR 355. 
101. Ibidem, par. 32. 
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Court lead to the conclusion that an arguable claim is a claim that could have 
some value and that is founded on an asserted infringement of a liberty or right 
guaranteed by the ECHR. 
In Klass and Others v. Germany the Court commented that Article 13: "re-
quires that where an individual considers himself to have been prejudiced by a 
measure allegedly in breach of the Convention, he should have a remedy before 
a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, 
to obtain redress"102. This approach would either suggest that this Article should 
be interpreted as guaranteeing an "effective remedy before a national authority" 
to everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention have 
been violated" (emphasis added). In this vein, in Conka v. Belgium the Court 
held that the procedure followed by the Belgian authorities on the detention of 
rejected Roma asylum seekers before deportation to Slovakia constituted inter 
alia a violation of this Article as it did not provide an effective remedy in ac-
cordance with this provision, requiring guarantees of suspensive effect103. Later 
case law concerning Article 13 has confirmed this trend in approach by the 
Strasbourg court. Regard, for example, the Court's decision in Gebremedhin 
v. France, which is representative: it said that the particular border procedure 
declaring "manifestly unfounded" asylum applications inadmissible, and con-
sequently refusing the asylum seeker entry into the territory, was incompatible 
with this Article taken together with Article 3, as that in order to be effective the 
domestic remedy must have suspensive effect as of right104. By the same token, 
in Jabari v. Turkey, a case concerning an Iranian national seeking political asy-
lum in Turkey, the Court - requested to review inter alia Whether the applicant 
effectively had a proper remedy against the refusal to consider the asylum ap-
plication, since the appeal procedure did not have suspensive effect - has left 
no doubt that: "... the notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires in-
dependent and rigorous scmtiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds 
for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 and the possibility of 
suspending the implementation of the measure impugned..."105. This finding 
was reiterated in Clahal v. United Kingdom. Here, it observed that: "... Article 
13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the sub-
stance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might hap-
102. Para. 64. 
103. See ECHR, Conka v. Belgium, Judgment of 5 February 2002 [2002] 13 (1-2) Human 
Rights Case Digest 47-53(7) 3. 
104. See ECHR, Gebremedhin v. France, Judgment of 26 April 2007, appl. 25389/05, 67. 
105. Ibidem, para 50 (emphasis added). 
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pen to be secured in the domestic legal order"106. As it has been duly recognised 
in the aforementioned decision, it follows that: "the effect of this Article is thus 
to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national 
authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint 
and to grant appropriate relief..."107. Finally, of particular interest to asylum 
seekers is either that the lack of a notification of the extradition decision to the 
applicant who discovered about the extradition in general terms on a TV broad-
cast the evening before the extradition may infringe the applicant's right to an 
effective remedy in violation of Article 13 of the ECHR1 0 8. However, either the 
language and meaning of this provision shows that this can not be interpreted as 
to require that an effective remedy should exist whenever an individual claims 
to be the victim of a violation under the ECHR. 
3.8. The Incompatibility Of Discriminatory Measures With Article 14 
The ECHR also contains a non-discrimination provision whereby it states 
that the rights embodied in the document: "will be exercised without discrimi-
nation of any kind...". Presumably, based on this provision, asylum seekers, as 
well as nationals, can benefit from the fundamental rights outlined in ECHR, 
without undue discrimination109. 
The language of Article 14 shows that this does not create a self-support-
ing right not to be discriminated against, but one connected to the enjoyment 
of the Convention rights and freedoms. Quoting Gomien et al., it has only an 
"accessory nature and autonomous status"110. Therefore, it exclusively applies 
where the subject matter of another Convention right has been triggered. But 
106. See ECHR, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 November 1996 [1997] 
23EHRR413. 
107. Para. 145 (emphasis added). 
108. See ECHR, Shanayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, 12 April 2005, appl. n. 
36378/02 [2005] EHRC, 4 (1), 23-27. 
109. See also Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR which contains a "General Prohibition 
of Discrimination". For a commentary on the meaning and scope of this provision, as well as its 
relationship with Article 14 of the ECHR see amongst others PETTITI, C , "Le Protocole n. 12 á 
la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertes fundamentales. Une protec-
tion effective contre les discriminations", in Revue hellenique des droits de l'homme, 2006, p. 
805 ss; SEATZU, F., " I I Protocollo n. 12 alia Convenzione europea per la protezione dei diritti 
dell'uomo: uno strumento giuridico efficace per la tutela dell'eguaglianza e l'eliminazione delle 
discriminazioni?", in Jus, 2002, p. 483 ff. 
110. SeeGoMiEN,D. etal., Law andPractice ojthe European Convention on Human Rights 
and the European Social Charter (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 1996) 346. 
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this does not imply that it is also necessary for the other Convention rights to 
be breached in order for Article 14 to apply. For example, a law forbidding all 
asylum seekers of one country from access in a Contracting Party to the ECHR 
would be surely forbidden under Article 141 1 1. Moreover, the effect of Article 
14 is not such that all discriminatory treatment will be contrary to the ECHR 
as such an approach would clearly be unpractical. Instead, the Court has estab-
lished that a difference in treatment which is capable of objective and reason-
able justification will not fall foul of Article 14. 
Despite the practical nature of this approach, it is obvious that it may none-
theless be adopted to justify the unequal handling of adults and children seek-
ing asylum under the ECHR. In particular, where there are sound and objective 
reasons for treating asylum seekers in a different manner, either from nationals 
or from each other, then the supposed unequal treatment will not be in breach 
of Article 14. Notwithstanding all these restrictions, the grounds on which dis-
criminatory is forbidden under Article 14 are extensive. The text of the provision 
requires that ECHR rights be sheltered without discrimination on any grounds, 
and the following are provided as examples solely: race, language, religion, po-
litical or other opinion, sex, property, birth or other status. The broad scope of the 
provision suggests that there is huge potentiality for interpreting Article 14 in an 
expansive manner. In relation to asylum seekers, it is relevant that the criteria of 
race and national origin have been found to fall within the scope of "other status". 
The Court has developed its case law on Article 14 in a positive way, and 
the implications of this for the application of the ECHR to individuals seek-
ing asylum are in brief illustrated here. Firstly, it has found that the provision 
applies not only to those elements that it chooses to guarantee. In a milestone 
decision, the so called Belgian Linguistics Case, it established that though there 
was no obligation on the State to provide a particular system of education, 
where a State chooses to do so, it can not hamper access to it in a discriminatory 
way 1 1 2. The potential of this approach is clear and it can be useful in seeking to 
ensure equal access to education by children seeking asylum in a Contracting 
State for example. Secondly, the scope of the provision being invoked with 
Article 14 can influence the latter provision's scope of protection. Therefore, 
if there is a positive duty implicit in the substantive provision, then this can be 
111. See FITZPATRICK, J. (ed), Human Rights Protection for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and 
Internally Displaced Persons: A Guide to International Mechanisms and Procedures (Ardsley, 
New York, Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2001) 383. 
112. See ECHR, Belgian Linguistic case, Judgment 23 July 1968, Application no 1474/62; 
1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, Court Series A, v. 6 (3-5) 30-2. 
A.E.D.I., vol. XXV (2009) 495 
F R A N C E S C O S E A T Z U 
translated as an obligation to promote equality, rather than to protect against 
discrimination when the two provisions are read together. For instance, Article 
8 does not provide a duty to grant a proper standard of health and health care. 
Nevertheless, it is sufficient for the purposes of Article 14 that the measure falls 
within the scope of respect for family and private life. In this way, a failure to 
award an adequate standard of health will raise a crucial issue under Article 14, 
taken together with Article 8. Again, this well exemplifies the further point that 
regardless of its complementary character, an infringement of Article 14 can 
take place even if a contravention of a substantive provision is neither demon-
strated, nor even designated. As a result, a measure, such as a denial to accord 
a proper standard of health care will be in breach of Article 14, even though 
it can be consistent with Article 8, unless it can be reasonably and objectively 
substantiated. In this way, Article 14 adds a relevant stage to the trial of whether 
a Convention provision has been infringed, and in the light of the extensive 
grounds on which discrimination is forbidden, it enlarges the safeguard that the 
Convention advances to asylum seekers generally. 
3.9. The Right Of Asylum Seekers To Property 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides that: 
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right 
of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of prop-
erty in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other contributions or penalties". 
As it is suggested by its wording this Article encompasses two major rights 
- that is to say the right not to be deprived of one's "possessions" and the right 
not to have their use controlled. But according to a well established case-law of 
the European Court also the right to compensation for expropriation or similar 
measures is interpreted to fit into this provision113. 
The question which arises under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is whether 
it is relevant in the present context. Dealing with the protection of the right to 
113. For references on this issue see ALLEN, T., "Compensation for Property under the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights" (2007) Michigan Journal of International Law 287 ff. 
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property of asylum seekers and international displaced persons in the General 
Recommendation XXII on refugees and displaced persons the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter "CERD") tersely stated that 
these subjects: "have, after their return to their homes of origin, the right to have 
restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of the con-
flict and to be compensated appropriately for any such property that cannot be 
restored to them..."114. Indeed, as displacement frequently entails leaving behind 
a large amount of one's possessions, asylum seekers, refugees and internation-
ally displaced persons necessitate safeguards, not solely for all they might attain 
during or after displacement, but also for the possessions they leave behind. The 
European Court eloquently captured this point in Kristina Blecic v. Croatia, as 
it found that the judicial termination of the applicant's tenancy right constitutes 
a violation inter alia of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since she was deprived of the 
possibility to purchase the flat under favourable conditions115. Aware of the strong 
reactions that this interpretation had given rise to, it took the opportunity given by 
the Akimova v. Azerbaijan case to better clarify its position. Having outlined that 
the fundamental right to property applies to non nationals, it further explained 
that either the deprivation in the interests of refugees of the applicant's tenancy 
rights to an apartment that she has not moved into as its erection was not com-
pleted has to be regarded in violation of the right to property116. Self evidently, the 
same conclusion should apply if the deprivation of the applicant's property is not 
made in the interests of refugees but asylum seekers. 
IV. FINAL REMARKS 
The systematic cutback of border controls manifestly indicate that the 
amount of cases challenging asylum decisions under the ECHR and its addi-
tional Protocols is expected to continue to develop. As a result, the risk of open-
ing the accesses to individuals (adults and children) entering Contracting States 
to seek sanctuary is apt to corroborate the European Court of Human Rights in 
its rather watchful approach in this sector. 
114. See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommenda-
tion XXII on refugees and displaced persons (forty nine session) A/51/18 (1996). General Rec-
ommendation XXII: Article 5 and refugees and displaced persons (Forty ninth session, 1996), in 
HRI/GEN/lRev.4 at 151, § 2 (c). 
115. See ECHR, Kristina Blecic v. Croatia, Judgment of 14 September 2005, Appl. no. 
59532/00 [2005] ECHR 600. 
116. See ECHR, Akimova v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of 27 September 2007, Application no. 
19853/03 [2007] ECHR 751. 
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Yet, there are relevant trends appearing in the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court, especially with regard to the meaning of maintaining the affiliation 
between a minor seeking asylum in a Contracting State and his/her parent, and 
it is therefore significant that this Court maintain to tackle the needs of minors 
seeking asylum in this milieu, where the various incompatible interests of per-
son and state are inclined habitually to curb the vital problems of minors enter-
ing Contracting States to seek sanctuary. Besides, it has taken a more ethical 
approach to the concepts of "family" and "family life" in recent decisions and 
this widens the provision's potential to defend the "intended" family, which is, 
one's fiancé(e), albeit that it is not easy to demonstrate that interferences with 
family life caused by asylum measures are untenable. For this raison d'etre, it is 
to be expected that procedures, according to which asylum decisions are taken, 
will be the subject matter of future judicial judgments in this context. Due to the 
fact that Article 6 of the ECHR is not normally applicable to asylum cases, the 
principle under Article 8 which requires adequate participation by the parties 
in decision making processes concerning the family might have a major role to 
play in this sector. The treatment of illegal asylum seekers either can raise an 
issue of compatibility with the ECHR, inter alia under Article 5 with regard 
to detention. In this context, it is arguable that an individual who has illegally 
entered a Contracting State if arbitrarily detained or detained there under unac-
ceptable conditions, for example in an airport international transit zone, may 
complain to the Court under this provision117. 
It is essential that all asylum seekers are warranted ECHR rights, espe-
cially with regard to the right to enjoy effective freedoms and rights, such as 
freedom of association, freedom of religion, right to a private and family life, 
right to an effective remedy before a national authority and rights to health and 
education. The potential of the ECHR's provisions in this area has so far to 
be measured by the European Court and the scope of the legal duty to respect 
private and family life is either vague. But it is possible to maintain that where a 
minor seeking asylum enters a Contracting State unaccompanied, Article 8 de-
mands the implementation of proper measures to endorse his/her reunification 
with relatives. The conditions of the case, of course, will establish the subsist-
ence of such a duty and its extent, but an evolutive approach to such minors' 
cases must not be lined out. 
117. See supra par. 3.2. 
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Abstract 
This article provides a critical assessment of 
the corpus of law that the European Court of 
Human Rights has used for the protection of as-
ylum seekers since its re-foundation in 1999. 
After presenting a taxonomy of fundamental 
rights in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 
I move to detect, and to present a critical 
appraisal of, the philosophy of the European 
Court of Human Rights, when called to inter-
pret them in relation to the protection of asylum 
seekers. The Articles with possible significance 
to asylum will be considered in turn, with the 
exceptions of Article 3 of the ECHR and Arti-
cle 3 of the Fourth Protocol as they deserve a 
separate consideration. 
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